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The last three decades have witnessed a huge amount of research exploring the link-
age between companies' sustainability performance (SP), sustainability disclosure and
financial performance (FP). Researchers have applied various methods and techniques
to investigate this relationship, yet the results remain equivocal. In this article, we look
inside this black box by considering various manifestations of sustainability practices
and investigating their link with FP. We apply a manual content analysis technique
to analyse the sustainability reports of the 100 best‐performing US firms. Our results
reveal that fragmentation in the results is caused by the SP measurement. Addition-
ally, we note that the interlinkages between different SP dimensions and sub‐dimen-
sions are weak and somewhat contradictory. The results help draw important policy
implications for the development of an SP reporting framework.
KEYWORDS
corporate sustainability performance, disclosure, financial performance, G3 guidelines, Global
Reporting Initiative2The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) was established in 1997 and is an interna-
tional independent standards organization. The first guidelines were issued in
the year 2000, and to date many updated versions have been launched.
3Fortune magazine issues a list of the 100, 250 and 500 best‐performing com-1 | INTRODUCTION
Does it pay to be sustainable? This question has been asked by many
studies in the last three decades, yet the results are fragmented
(Callan & Thomas, 2009; Barnett & Salomon, 2012; Song, Zhao, & Zeng,
2017). Recent discursive and meta‐analytical reviews by Horváthová
(2010), Endrikat, Guenther, and Hoppe (2014) and Lu, Chau, Wang,
and Pan (2014) suggest that the uneven application of sustainability
performance (SP) measures is one of the main causes of the prevailing
equivocality of results. The existing literature so far has neglected the
multifaceted nature of sustainability measurement (Trumpp, Endrikat,
Zopf, & Guenther, 2015). Most of the researchers in the given SP and
financial performance (FP) nexus either used third‐party SP measure-
ment such as KLD1 (e.g. Tang, Hull, & Rothenberg, 2012; Tebini, M'Zali,LD) covers 3000 public com-
erformance of covered firms.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
e Creative Commons Attribution Li
y and Environmental ManagementLang, & Perez‐Gladish, 2016;Waddock & Graves, 1997) or self‐defined
measurement (e.g. Mahoney, LaGore, & Scazzero, 2008; Godfrey &
Hatch, 2007). This lack of congruent SP measurement has created
confusion about the relationship between SP and FP (Horváthová,
2010). To clear up this confusion, we conduct an in‐depth analysis
of the relationship between sustainability disclosure (SD), SP and FP.
Our measurement is based on a widely accepted reporting framework,
i.e. the GRI framework.2
We analyse 152 sustainability reports from the 100 best‐
performing3 US firms by applying a manual content analysis technique.panies every year. The companies on the list are ranked by revenue growth,
increase in earnings per share and three‐year total stock return. The overall
ranking is determined by the sum of the three ranks.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
cense, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided
published by ERP Environment and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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HUSSAIN ET AL. 1199We categorize the SP information for each indicator category – eco-
nomic, environmental and social – separately. Such a classification
allows us to calculate an SP index for each indicator and sub‐category
(see Table 2 later for a detailed description). To test the inter‐linkages
(Antolin‐Lopez, Delgado‐Ceballos, & Montiel, 2016; Bradford, Earp,
Showalter, & Williams, 2016; Lozano & Huisingh, 2011) between indi-
vidual SP components, we collect data on sub‐dimensions of the SP
indicators. This helps provide fact‐based results about the underlying
relationship and points to the underlying causes of divergence among
extant results. To shed further light on this relationship, we utilize
third‐party SD data as well.
The empirical results provide several insights; first, mere SD does
not show any significant relationship with any of the FP measures,
while SP measures show a significant correlation with FP. We further
observe that not all the sub‐dimensions of the SP indicator are equally
related to FP; however, some do show a significant relationship with
FP. We also note that some sub‐dimensions are negatively related
within and across indicators. Second, environmental performance
(EP) and social performance remain consistently positive and signifi-
cant across all FP measures. Third, our results contribute to the
existing debate on the SP–FP relationship by showing that using a sta-
ble and comprehensive SP measurement can yield conclusive results.
Our results contribute towards stakeholder theory by showing that
sustainability initiatives are positively linked with FP. The results have
relevant policy implications for designing a comprehensive and value‐
relevant SP measurement framework. These results are useful for
managers in demonstrating that real commitment towards sustainable
corporate development pays off in terms of superior FP.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the next
section discusses the findings of the extant literature. Section 3 is
devoted to discussion about theory and hypothesis development.
Section 4 describes our methodology. In Section 5, we present the
empirical findings. In the last two sections, we discuss our results
and outline conclusions, implications and future research directions.2 | PRIOR EVIDENCE
There are different schools of thought4 concerning the SP–FP nexus
(see Molina‐Azorín, Claver‐Cortés, López‐Gamero, & Tarí, 2009;
Revelli & Viviani, 2015). Proponents of the neoclassical school
(‘traditionalist view’) have argued that sustainability initiatives impose
additional costs (see, e.g., Walley & Whitehead, 1994; Hamilton,
1995), whereas Porter (1991) and Porter and Van der Linde (1995)
support the ‘revisionist view’ and argue that such initiatives create
win–win situations by enhancing FP and social welfare. Flammer
(2015) and Marti, Rovira‐Val, and Drescher (2015) note that invest-
ment in sustainability yields positive accounting performance. Simi-
larly, Wang and Tuttle (2014) argue that sustainability has become4Traditionalists and revisionists hold competing views about firms' engagement
with sustainability initiatives and its impact on FP. Friedman (1962) considers
economic profit making as the only social responsibility of the firm. He argues
that CSR is a ‘subversive doctrine’ (p. 133). On the other hand, Porter (1991)
and Porter and Van der Linde (1995) have formulated the ‘Porter hypothesis’,
according to which the investment in sustainability is in the long‐term benefit
of stakeholders as well as investors.an important contributor to investment returns by sending a positive
signal to the financial market.
The third stream of research challenges both traditionalist as well
as revisionist views and supports an inverse U‐shaped relationship
(Lankoski, 2000; Wagner, 2001) by arguing that sustainability is bene-
ficial to a limited extent. Others have argued for a neutral association
between firms' responsible behaviour and resulting benefits
(McWilliams & Siegel, 2001). Table 1 provides an overview of the
mixed empirical results. We systematically review the literature and
present the competing approaches.
Literature supporting the revisionist view identifies several incen-
tives for sustainability engagement. These benefits include improved
competitiveness (Porter & Van der Linde, 1995), improved relations
with stakeholders and compliance with regulations, higher return on
investments and lower financing cost (Derwall & Koedijk, 2009;
Orens, Aerts, & Cormier, 2010), higher shareholder value (Porter &
Kramer, 2011) and better share performance (Eccles, Ioannou, &
Serafeim, 2014).
Conversely, Shane and Spicer (1983), Cordeiro and Sarkis (1997)
and Preston and O'Bannon (1997) argue that sustainability engage-
ment is detrimental for FP. Hamilton (1995) finds a negative relation-
ship between the Toxic Release Inventory and share price. Similarly,
Khanna and Damon (1999) find a negative impact of Toxic Release
Inventory on return on investment. Likewise, Konar and Cohen
(2001) note that information about toxic chemical disclosure impacts
financial performance negatively in the US manufacturing sector. On
the other hand, Pava and Krausz (1996), King and Lenox (2001) and
Link and Naveh (2006) report an insignificant relationship between
SP and FP.
Similar competition among reported results can be seen in many
other studies. Horváthová (2010) conducts a meta‐analysis on 64 out-
comes from 37 empirical studies and concludes that the inconsistency
that prevails is due to methodical inconsistency. More recently, Wang,
Dou, and Jia (2016) analysed 119 outcomes from 42 empirical studies
and found that the measurement of the SP constructs creates varia-
tion in the results. The body of knowledge is growing, yet the results
are inconclusive. Keeping in view the competing results, our study
aims to fill this void by using a more refined measurement of SP.3 | HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
The review of the existent literature shows that not only are the
empirical findings contradictory, but the use of theories is also incon-
sistent (see Table 1). Moreover, theories used in existing SP–FP nexus
literature are based on contending assumptions; for example, agency
theory (Al‐Najjar & Anfimiadou, 2012; Surroca & Tribó, 2008) and
stakeholder theory (Hoepner, Oikonomou, Scholtens, & Schröder,
2016; Trumpp & Guenther, 2015) are based on opposing assumptions
(Hussain, Rigoni, & Orij, 2016); yet many researchers use these two
theories to provide the rationale for similar research questions
(McWilliams, Siegel, & Wright, 2006; Wahba, 2008). Among all these
theories, the stakeholder theory is the dominant theory, suggesting a
positive relationship between corporate sustainability initiatives and
FP (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001).
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HUSSAIN ET AL. 1201Stakeholder theory assumes that a firm should take into consid-
eration the needs of a wider variety of stakeholders and not only
the profit requirements of its owners (Freeman, 1984). Endorsing
stakeholder theory as a relevant theoretical lens, Freeman (2010)
argues that, although shareholders' wealth creation is at the top of
the corporate agenda, firms should not ignore the needs of a wider
spectrum of stakeholders. He further argues that such stakeholders
play a vital role for the success, survival and growth of a firm. Under
a similar assumption, Russo and Fouts (1997) document a significant
positive relationship between environmental disclosure and FP. Simi-
larly, King and Lenox (2002) and Ducassy (2013) observe a positive
relationship between EP and FP. Waddock and Graves (1997)
argue that, if the firm does not incur the explicit cost of being
sustainable, then it has to incur an implicit cost of losing competitive
advantage. Likewise, Hull and Rothenberg (2008) maintain that SP is
a tool to improve stakeholder management. Moreover, stakeholder
theory supports a positive relationship between both SD and SP with
FP. To validate theoretical claims and corroborate empirical findings
we hypothesize following relationships.5The sel
of the su
6Corpor
ing the wH1 SD is positively linked to FP.
H2 SP is positively linked to FP.4 | METHODOLOGY
4.1 | Sample design and data collection
We limit our research to US companies belonging to the Global
Fortune 100 best‐performing companies list. According to the GRI's
annual list of reporting firms, we selected companies that have issued
a sustainability report at least once during our study period, from 2007
to 2011.5 This selection principle allows us to identify 44 companies
belonging to 12 different industries. From the website of each
company and the website of Corporate Register6 (http://www.
corporateregister.com/), we collected 152 sustainability reports issued
by these companies.4.2 | | Research design and variable measurement
4.2.1 | Research design
We employed three sets of panel regression models. All the models
included a set of the relevant control variables identified in the prom-
inent literature. In the first regression model, we include traditional SD
indexes: environmental, social and governance (ESG parameters), as pro-
vided by Bloomberg and discussed in the next section. The dependent
variables are firms' accounting (ROA and ROE) and market‐based
(Tobin's Q) FP measures. In more formal terms, we tested the follow-
ing equation:ected time range is the longest period without updates or modifications
stainability reporting guidelines (G3 guidelines).
ateRegister.com Ltd is an independent and self‐funded company, hold-
orld's largest directory of sustainability reports.
TABLE 2 Dependent, independent, and control variables
Description
Dependent
TOBINQ Tobin's Q ratio
ROA return on assets
ROE return on shareholders' equity
Independent
ESG_Environmental environmental disclosure score
ESG_Social social disclosure score
ESG_Governance governance disclosure score
EC_SUST economic sustainability performance; a product
variable of relevance quantity and quality
indexes
EN_SUST environmental sustainability performance; a
product variable of relevance quantity and
quality indexes
SO_SUST social sustainability performance; a product
variable of relevance quantity and quality
indexes
EC_SUSTsub1 direct economic performance (economic sub‐
dimension 1); a product variable of relevance
quantity and quality indexes
EC_SUSTsub2 market presence of a company (economic sub‐
dimension 2); a product variable of relevance
quantity and quality indexes
EC_SUSTsub3 indirect economic effect (economic sub‐
dimension 3); a product variable of relevance
quantity and quality indexes
EN_SUSTsub1 input (environmental sub‐dimension 1); a
product variable of relevance quantity and
quality indexes
EN_SUSTsub2 output (environmental sub‐dimension 2); a
product variable of relevance quantity and
quality indexes
EN_SUSTsub3 environmental compliance (environmental sub‐
dimension 3); a product variable of relevance
quantity and quality indexes
SO_SUSTsub1 labour practices & decent work (social sub‐
dimension 1); a product variable of relevance
quantity and quality indexes
SO_SUSTsub2 human rights (social sub‐dimension 2); a
product variable of relevance quantity and
quality indexes
SO_SUSTsub3 society (social sub‐dimension 3); a product
variable of relevance quantity and quality
indexes
SO_SUSTsub4 product responsibility (social sub‐dimension 4);
a product variable of relevance quantity and
quality indexes
Control
ENV_SENS dummy variable taking value 1 if firm belongs to
an environmentally sensitive industry, 0
otherwise
SIZE log of total assets of the firm as measure of size
CAP_INT capital intensity of the firm as ratio of capital
expenditure and total assets
RD_INT R&D intensity of the firm as ratio of research
and development expenditure to total sales
SALE_GROW one year growth in sales
D/E ratio of debt to equity in the capital structure
1202 HUSSAIN ET AL.FPit ¼ αþ β1ESGenvironmental it þ β2ESGsocial it þ β3ESGgovernance it
þ βxcontrolsit þ εit:
(1)Our next two regression equations test the relationship between
SP and FP. Formally, our second and third equations are
FPit ¼ αþ β1EC SUSTit þ β2EN SUSTit þ β3SO SUSTit
þ βxcntrolsit þ εit
(2)
FPit¼αþβ1ECSUSTsub1itþβ2ECSUSTsub2itþβ3ECSUSTsub3it
þβ4ENSUSTsub1itþβ5ENSUSTsub2itþβ6ENSUSTsub3it
þβ7SOSUSTsub1itþβ8SOSUSTsub2itþβ9SOSUSTsub3it
þβ10SOSUSTsub4itþβxcontrolsitþεit:
(3)
Based upon the Hausman (1978) specification test results, we
apply fixed‐effect panel regression analysis for all our equations.
4.2.2 | Measurement of variables
To test our first model, we used the ESG parameters provided by
Bloomberg. Bloomberg ESG scores range from 0 to 100 depending
on the number of data points disclosed by companies. The more the
company discloses, the higher the score. ESG estimation covers a
broad range of items (Lo & Kwan, 2017). ESG scores are broad,
although not verifiable, measures of firm sustainability disclosure.
Despite their limitations, we use ESG scores to understand whether
SD is relevant for firms' FP.
In Models 2 and 3 we use verifiable SP measures that are based
on GRI guidelines. GRI argues that sustainability reports based on its
guidelines can be used as a benchmark for organizational performance
and demonstration of organizational commitment towards sustainable
development goals (GRI, 2006). GRI reporting framework challenges
firms to report on both positive and negative aspects of their perfor-
mance, according to a specific list of items classified in three distinct
dimensions (economic, environmental and social dimensions) broken
down into various sub‐dimensions. The economic dimension is mea-
sured by nine items divided into three sub‐dimensions: direct
economic performance (1–4), market presence (5–7) and indirect
economic impact on society (8, 9).
The environmental dimension is also composed of three sub‐
dimensions: inputs (material, energy and water), outputs (emissions,
effluents and waste) and compliance (environmental compliance, and
other relevant information such as environmental expenditure and
the impacts of products and services). Each sub‐dimension is deter-
mined by 10 out of a total of 30 items. The social dimension of
sustainability is composed of four sub‐dimensions. These sub‐dimen-
sions are labour practices and decent work (Items 1–14), human rights
(Items 15–23), society (Items 24–31) and product responsibility (Items
32–40). According to GRI indications, we measured the performance
of the economic, environmental and social dimensions as well as the
performance of each sub‐dimension of the three sustainability pillars.
For each dimension and sub‐dimension, we measured the disclo-
sure level on a binary scale (1 when the information on an item is
provided and 0 otherwise). This procedure allows us to generate for
each level a disclosure index as the ratio between the number of items
disclosed and the overall number of items included in the dimension or
sub‐dimension. As for the quality of the sustainability disclosure, we
calculated a quality index based on the classification of positive and
7As a robustness check, we winsorized our variables at 10th and 90th percen-
tiles. The results do not show any significant differences.
TABLE 3 Descriptive statistics
Panel A Sustainability disclosure measures (ESG parameters)
Full
sample
Not environmentally
sensitive industry
(ENV_SENS = 0)
Environmentally
sensitive industry
(ENV_SENS = 1)
Wilcoxon
rank‐sum test
Environmental disclosure transparency
(ESG_Environmental)
N mean 143 38.888 92 36.866 51 42.536 **
Social disclosure transparency
(ESG_Social)
N mean 144 41.201 92 39.363 52 44.453 **
Governance disclosure transparency
(ESG_Governance)
N mean 144 63.951 92 62.927 52 65.762 ***
***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05.
Panel A provides the main descriptives for the ESG indicators (ESG_Environmental, ESG_ Social and ESG_Governance).
Panel B Sustainability performance measures (our indicators)
Full sample
Not environmentally
sensitive industry
(ENV_SENS = 0)
Environmentally
sensitive industry
(ENV_SENS = 1)
Wilcoxon
rank‐sum test
Economic sustainability
performance (EC_SUST)
N mean 152 0.412 99 0.412 53 0.411 not sig.
Environmental sustainability
performance (EN_SUST)
N mean 152 0.452 99 0.458 53 0.441 not sig.
Social sustainability performance
(SO_SUST)
N mean 152 0.467 99 0.478 53 0.447 not sig.
Panel B provides the main descriptives for the sustainability performance indicators (EC_SUST, EN_SUST and SO_SUST).
Panel C Financial performance measures (dependent variables)
Full sample
Not environmentally
sensitive industry
(ENV_SENS = 0)
Environmentally
sensitive industry
(ENV_SENS = 1)
Wilcoxon
rank‐sum test
ROA N mean 151 7.344 98 7.266 53 7.488 not sig.
ROE N mean 151 18.621 98 19.822 53 16.402 not sig.
TOBINQ N mean 151 2.867 98 3.150 53 23.452 *
*p < 0.1.
Panel C provides the main descriptives for the financial performance measures used in the regression models (ROA, ROE and TOBINQ).
Panel D Firm‐specific control variables
Full sample
Not environmentally
sensitive industry
(ENV_SENS = 0)
Environmentally
sensitive industry
(ENV_SENS = 1)
Wilcoxon
rank‐sum test
SIZE N mean 152 11.322 99 11.443 53 11.097 not sig.
D/E N mean 152 30.438 99 32.028 53 27.468 not sig.
CAP_INT N mean 152–0.06 99–0.0447 53–0.099 ***
RD_INT N mean 152 0.0304 99 0.027 53 0.062 ***
SALES_GROWTH N mean 150 8.255 98 7.897 52 8.928 *
***p < 0.01. *p < 0.1.
Panel D provides the main descriptives for the control variables used in the regression models.
HUSSAIN ET AL. 1203negative information disclosed. Our classification technique relied on
the definitions provided by Patten and Crampton (2003, p. 40). This
approach is consistent also with the work of Plumlee, Brown, Hayes,
and Marshall (2015)). The classification of the sustainability informa-
tion as positive and negative allowed us to calculate a quality index,
which is a normalized algorithm proposed by Krajnc and Glavič
(2005) and used by Hussain et al. (2016) for SP measurement:
quality indexit ¼
real scoreitð Þ− minimum scoreitð Þ
maximum scoreitð Þ− minimum scoreitð Þ: (4)
In Equation (4), ‘real score’ is the algebraic sum of positive and
negative scores; ‘minimum’ is the minimum potential score assignedto each sustainability category, which occurs when all the information
provided has been classified as negative, while ‘maximum’ indicates
the contrary: the maximum potential number of information items
with a positive sign.
Finally, we calculate our measure of SP, multiplying the disclosure
index and the quality index of each dimension and sub‐dimension.
Table 2 summarizes the sustainability indexes. We winsorized data at
1st and 99th percentiles.7 To ensure the reliability of content‐analysis‐
based measures, we calculated the ‘Krippendorf alpha’ as the reliability
measure. We calculate inter‐coder reliability using the Krippendorf
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HUSSAIN ET AL. 1205alpha on 25% of the data coded by two researchers. The value of
alpha should be ‘greater than 0.67 for useful conclusions’
(Krippendorff, 2004, p. 241). We find that all the alpha values for dis-
closure and quality indexes are above the acceptable threshold value.
To proxy a firm's performance we use both market and account-
ing performance measures. In the first category, we select the Tobin's
Q ratio, which measures the market appreciation/depreciation of the
firm's value with respect to the book value of the company
(Lindenberg & Ross, 1981). We select ROA and ROE as proxies for
accounting performance. We select a set of control variables accord-
ing to the extant literature. More specifically, we use firm size, sales
growth, capital intensity and debt‐to‐equity ratio as firm‐specific con-
trols. In line with Hussain et al. (2016), we include ENV_SENS, a
dummy variable capturing whether the company belongs to an envi-
ronmentally sensitive industry.5 | EMPIRICAL RESULTS
5.1 | Descriptive statistics
We present the descriptive statistics in Table 3 for the entire dataset
and by type of industry (environmentally sensitive or not). More spe-
cifically, Panel A reports statistics referring to the SD measures while
Panel B shows details for the SP dimensions that we extracted from
the sustainability reports of the reporting companies. Panel C provides
details for the dependent variables and Panel D for the controls used
in the regression analysis.
Panel A documents that, as expected and supported in the litera-
ture (see, e.g., Xu, 1999), the mean disclosure level of the sustainability
issues (as measured by the ESG parameters) depends systematically
on the kind of industry considered: the ESG scores of the environmen-
tally sensitive industries are greater than the scores attributed toTABLE 5 Regression results with ESG parameters
(1)
Variables ROA
ESG_Environmental 0.0444 (0.547)
ESG_Social −0.0537 (0.305)
ESG_Governance −0.109 (0.314)
SIZE −4.573*** (0.00978)
ENV_SENS 5.152*** (4.64 × 10−7)
D/E 0.00962* (0.0701)
CAP_INT −1.899 (0.936)
RD_INT −95.25* (0.0677)
SALES_GROWTH 0.0442* (0.0599)
Constant 67.89*** (7.47 × 10−5)
Observations 143
R‐squared 0.215
Number of ticker 42
Company FE yes
Year FE yes
Robust p‐value in parentheses.
***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.1.environmentally less sensitive industries. The Wilcoxon rank‐sum test
results support this notion. This results further support the idea
that environmentally sensitive industries have multifaceted pressure
from various stakeholder groups and that such companies disclose
more (Lyon & Maxwell, 2011). On the other hand, Panel B shows that
the SP does not vary by industry type. In other words, the environ-
mental sensitivity trait does not affect the average level of the SP
significantly. Combining the evidence, we document that GRI
reporting firms can differ in the level of SD, but they perform similarly
from a SP perspective. More specifically, the differences between
the environmentally sensitive and insensitive industries are not
significant in most cases, indicating no systematic relation between
SP and industry characteristics.
In addition to the descriptive analysis results, we present
Spearman's correlation results in Table 4.
We find the highest positive and statistically significant correla-
tions between the SP variables, in both the dimension and sub‐dimen-
sion forms, and the FP variables. A noteworthy relationship is the one
between EC_SUSTsub1 and EN_SUSTsub2, which is (−0.203) negative
and significant. Similarly, there is a negative correlation (−0.243)
between SO_SUSTsub1 and SO_SUSTsub4. These results help us
corroborate the existing evidence of weak and sometimes opposing
inter‐linkages between different SP components. No significant corre-
lation has been detected between the ESG parameters and FP. Fur-
thermore, no relevant relationship has been found between the ESG
sustainability indicators and our SP indicators. This latter evidence fur-
ther supports the difference between the two kinds of measure used.5.2 | Multivariate results
5.2.1 | Sustainability disclosure and financial
performance
Table 5 reports the results of Equation (1).(2) (3)
ROE TOBINQ
0.0642 (0.756) −0.0129 (0.602)
−0.0646 (0.560) 0.00516 (0.822)
−0.00831 (0.979) −0.0333 (0.245)
−6.405 (0.199) −1.884** (0.0244)
13.13*** (1.77 × 10−6) −0.0244 (0.934)
−0.0124*** (0.00710) 0.00209* (0.0760)
5.447 (0.939) −5.173 (0.232)
−210.2** (0.0492) −6.456 (0.342)
0.101* (0.0675) 0.00616* (0.0742)
95.11** (0.0453) 26.51*** (0.00541)
143 143
0.107 0.227
42 42
yes yes
yes yes
1206 HUSSAIN ET AL.Our findings show that no ESG parameter is significantly related
to FP. This is valid for both the accounting performance (ROA and
ROE) and the market‐based performance (TOBINQ). This evidence
suggests that the level of a company's commitment to transparency
and accountability, as elaborated in the ESG parameters, is not rele-
vant to the FP of that company. As for the control variables,
ENV_SENS has a positive and significant relationship with the
accounting performance. Similarly, the SALE_GROWTH has a positive
linkage, but it seems weak. RD_INT is negatively associated with the
accounting performance, but it does not show any relationship with
the market‐based FP. SIZE is significant for ROA and TOBINQ only,
while the ratio D/E is strongly negatively associated with ROE.
5.2.2 | Sustainability performance and financial
performance
Tables 6 and 7 report the results of our main regression models (Equa-
tions (2) and 3).
Table 6 shows that the impact of the three dimensions of sustain-
ability performance is different depending on the financial perfor-
mance proxy considered. More precisely, the environmental and
social performance measures are significant and have a positive
impact on ROA, ROE and Tobin's Q. The economic dimension is on
the contrary relevant only when we measure the FP by the company
Tobin's Q ratio. In this case, the economic dimension shows a weak
correlation for TOBINQ (p = 0.0562) but the relationship turns out
to be negative.
Table 7 reports the results concerning the broken‐down SP
dimensions. These findings allow us to identify which specific compo-
nents of SP are related to FP. A number of aspects are worth pointing
out. First, the result concerning EC_SUST detected in Table 6 for the
TOBINQ variable disappears in this step: no economic‐related
sub‐dimension shows any influence on the financial performances
of a company when controlling for other firm‐specific factors.
Furthermore, not all the sub‐components of the environmental pillar
have similar associations with FP measures. The sub‐dimension
EN_SUSTsub1 is positive and significant (at 5%) for ROE (see Column
6), EN_SUSTsub2 is never relevant and EN_SUSTsub3 is positive and
significant at 10% for ROA (Column 3) and at 1% for TOBINQ
(Column 9). Results show that not all the dimensions are in line with
each other for representing the true relationship of environmental
performance to FP.
Regarding the social sub‐dimensions, SO_SUSTsub1 has a positive
effect onTOBINQ, while SO_SUSTsub2 and SO_SUSTsub4 affect pos-
itively the accounting measures only. In Table 6 we note that social
performance is weakly linked to TOBINQ. However, further in‐depth
analyses show that some aspects of the same measures are positively
linked to market‐based FP. For both Equations (2) and 3 we run the
variance inflation factor test to check for the multicollinearity issue.
The results did not raise any concerns.
Summarizing, our empirical evidence showed that the transpar-
ency of a company's sustainability commitment, as measured by the
ESG parameters, is not related to the company's FP. However, SP is
significantly linked to accounting as well as market‐based measures
of FP. Furthermore, we find a negative, although weak, relationship
between the economic sustainability performance of reportingcompanies and their market value. This shows weak and contrasting
links between various pillars of SP.
Analysis of the sub‐dimensions enabled us to better investigate
the most relevant results regarding components in each SP dimension.
More specifically, concerning the environmental pillar, the Inputs and
the Compliance dimensions (Sub‐dimensions 1 and 3, respectively)
showed a positive and significant relationship with both accounting
and market‐based FP. With regard to the social dimension, the sustain-
ability performance on Human Rights and Product Responsibility
(Sub‐dimensions 2 and 4, respectively) shows a link with the account-
ing performance only, while the reported sustainability performance
on Labour Practices & Decent Work (Sub‐dimension 1) may increase
the company market value only.6 | DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS
Our analysis aimed at exploring the relationship between SP and FP.
Our findings provide a new lens for obtaining a more profound insight
into the divergence in existing findings (see for comparison Brammer,
Brooks, & Pavelin, 2006; Mishra & Suar, 2010; Fujii, Iwata, Kaneko, &
Managi, 2013; Flammer, 2015; Trumpp & Guenther, 2015; Hoepner
et al., 2016). Our starting model (1), reported in Table 5, replicates
previous analyses (e.g. Nollet, Filis, & Mitrokostas, 2016) but uses a
special dataset of US companies. This specific sample selection allows
us to show that the ESG indicators, standard measures capturing the
voluntary disclosure of companies, are not related to FP, from either
an accounting or a market perspective. Although these results are
not in line with our expectations, they help us understand the reasons
for the prevailing fragmentation in the existing results. We believe that
the ESG indicators are not appropriate tools to analyse firms' behav-
iour as they lack specific performance measurement criteria.
Existing literature has so far neglected the multifaceted nature
of sustainability measurement (Trumpp et al., 2015). This creates a
huge knowledge gap, which we fill by providing fact‐based findings.
We elaborate a set of innovative indicators that are better adapted
to capture the essence of companies' efforts towards sustainability:
the SP measures included in Tables 6 and 7. As predicted, these
models suggest that findings support our intuition. The SP pillars,
measured in terms of performance and not just disclosure, may
affect significantly the FP. Specifically, we find that the inclusion of
our variables significantly improved the overall explanatory power
of the regression models and that the coefficients differ considerably
according to the specific sustainability dimension.
One of the most important results of our analyses is the negative
relationship between economic SP and market‐based measures of
financial performance. We measure SP in various dimensions and
sub‐dimensions and show that there is a need to seek better and more
aligned dimensions for sustainability reporting and SP measurement.
This is also evident from the negative correlations found in various
social, economic and environmental sub‐dimensions. Our findings are
supported by the fact that the GRI had already revised the G3 guide-
lines in 2012 and the new guidelines (G4) have modified 78% of the
items under the economic indicator. The environmental and social
dimensions are restructured by 57% and 37% respectively.
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HUSSAIN ET AL. 1209More specifically, the GRI has entirely eliminated EC_SUSTsub3.
Moreover, 85% of the input dimension of the environmental indicator
has been updated. Similarly, 50% of the society (SO_SUSTsub3) and
33% of the product responsibility (SO_SUSTsub4) dimension has been
updated (GRI, 2012). In the light of observed results, we argue that
there is a need for continuous improvement in the reporting frame-
works. Alternatively, our empirical evidence can be interpreted as sup-
port for the choice of integrated reporting, as argued by Dong (2017)
in his recent experiments. An integrated reporting framework provides
a holistic view of a firm's financial and non‐financial performance ave-
nues. Building inter‐linkages between economic and non‐economic
performance will provide better performance analysis prospects
(Antolin‐Lopez et al., 2016; Bradford et al., 2016; Lozano & Huisingh,
2011; Schons & Steinmeier, 2016). Furthermore, the choice of inte-
grated reporting can increase the usefulness and value relevance of
information provided by the company about its sustainability initia-
tives. The integrated reporting choice can ensure that the necessary
information reaches relevant market participants (Frias‐Aceituno,
Rodríguez‐Ariza, & Garcia‐Sánchez, 2014).7 | CONCLUSION, IMPLICATIONS AND
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
The objective of this research is to gain a deeper insight into the rela-
tionship between SP and FP by utilizing unique measures of SP based
on globally accepted SP reporting framework. The review of the
existing literature shows that there is a huge divergence in the existing
evidence (Endrikat et al., 2014; Horváthová, 2010; Wang et al., 2016).
These reviews motivated the present study to link SP and SD with FP.
We find that SP measurement matters and can provide better and
conclusive results about the direction of the relationship between sus-
tainability engagement and firms' performance. Our research also pro-
vides important insights concerning the compartmentalization of SP
dimensions by showing that these dimensions need to be revisited
and realigned.
Our results reveal that, no matter how great is the disclosure, the
real impact of this costly initiative of standalone reporting can only be
achieved by considerable commitment to sustainable development
goals. These results are clearly in line with stakeholder theory. Results
provide further support for the Porter hypothesis by showing that
genuine commitment towards corporate sustainability generates posi-
tive outcomes. In line with the findings of Pätäri, Jantunen, Kyläheiko,
and Sandström (2012) and Gómez‐Bezares, Przychodzen, and
Przychodzen (2017), we argue that firms should include sustainability
in their strategic planning and invest more in social and environmental
performance to achieve manifold performance objectives. We also
conclude that firms that invest more in sustainability, particularly if
characterized by an outstanding visibility, perform better. Our results
provide some important policy implications for the standard setter in
terms of providing new evidence about the need for more aligned
parameters for overall sustainability reporting standards. Based on
our findings of the relationships between various dimensions and
sub‐dimensions of SP, we would invite future research into the global
context and further investigation in other less developed ordeveloping economies. We consider that deploying a sub‐dimensional
analysis of SP can provide better insight into outcomes for managers
as well as policy makers.
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